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ABSTRACT 
The ongoing unsuccessfulness at the multilateral level finally cleared the way for so-
called Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT). It is estimated that of the almost 2,500 BITs in 
force approximately 40 per cent contain an 'umbrella' clause. Put simply, by virtue of this 
clause the signatories mutually obligate themselves to comply with any commitment or 
obligation - regardless its treaty-related or commercial nature - assumed with respect to 
specific investments in their territory made by nationals of the other signatory. The SGS 
decisions of 2003 gave reason to a discourse among scholars on the character of umbrella 
clauses since they reached opposed results. In addition, a considerable quantity of diverging 
decisions has been made by other ICSID tribunals. This paper endeavours to structure and 
analyse the arguments given in this context. In the end, the paper finds that the ordinary 
meaning of umbrella clauses is in accordance with a broad interpretation. According to this 
wide approach an umbrella clause elevates all contract-claims onto a treaty-level. 
Word length: 
The text of this paper (excluding the abstract, table of contents, footnotes, questions, and 
bibliography) comprises 14013 words. 
ll1 
I INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses the approach of ICSID tribunals and scholarly opinion to the 
meaning and legal effect of umbrella clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). Thereby, 
the paper tries to analyse the relevant ICSID decisions and legal comments made up to now. 
Under part II the paper gives a short introduction to BITs, umbrella clauses and the first two 
ICSID decisions on this issue. Subsequently, the paper illustrates under part III the remaining 
decisions and legal comments pointing out the reasons which led each tribunal and scholar to 
its conclusion. Under part IV the paper will mark out the legal principles by which a proper 
interpretation of the umbrella clause is to be achieved scrutinising the highlighted arguments. 
In its concluding remark, the paper finds that the ongoing discussion on umbrella clauses is 
drawn by a reliance on canons contrary to the principles of international customary law. 
Finally, a proper application of the latter principles results in an interpretation of the umbrella 
clause as equating contractual and treaty-based claims within the framework of investor-state 
arbitration. The phenomenon of umbrella clauses and this analysis basically refers to the 
framework of ICSID. The term ' decision ' in the context of this paper therefore alludes to 
decisions made by ICSID tribunals. 
II PRELIMINARY INFORMATION 
A Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Investor - State Arbitration 
Developing and least developed countries are in desperate need for foreign capital. 
Against this background it is not surprising that there is an ongoing competition for foreign 
investment among them. The flow of investment from capital-exporting to capital-importing 
countries, however, is severely hampered by concerns of foreign investors as to the 
safeguarding of their investment. These concerns originate from the fact that the investment is 
largely at the mercy of the host State ' s government and unprotected against measures of 
expropriation or nationalisation. Just as little, investors deem the court systems of capital-
importing countries as providing for legal security. Put simply, " [u]nder-development is 
strongly correlated with the absence of respect for contractual commitments." 1 There exists a 
widespread "perception [ ... ] that a foreign investor [ . . . ] cannot be expected to have, 
1 Thomas Walde "The Umbrella Clause in Investment Arbitration - A Comment on Original Intentions and 
Recent Cases" (2005) 6 The Journal of World Investment and Trade 183, 220 . 
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confidence in the impartiality of domestic courts, in particular in countries with a recognized 
low quality of governance."2 In order to overcome these concerns, capital exporting countries 
have made substantial efforts to negotiate a comprehensive multilateral investment agreement 
providing for enhanced security for foreign investments. 
A review of the recent past, however, shows the collapse of the negotiations on a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)3 made within the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1998 as well as the failure of similar negotiations 
undertaken in 2003 at the Ministerial Conference in Cancun of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). 4 Hence the substantial efforts undertaken by capital-exporting countries on a 
multilateral level have largely remained unsuccessful. The only ray of hope in this context 
arguably is the Energy Charter Treaty5 which applies to foreign investments in the energy 
sector. Till this day it has been signed by fifty-one states together with the European 
Communities.6 It is "so far [the] most ambitious project to set up an international investment 
(plus trade) regime."7 
In view of these facts it is not surprising that capital-exporting states have shifted their 
endeavors away from the negotiation of multilateral treaties to alternative means deemed 
appropriate to provide for enhanced security for investments made by their nationals in 
developing countries. The continuing unsuccessfulness at the multilateral level finally cleared 
the way for the rise of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), agreements between two 
countries with the sole objective to safeguard foreign investment. 8 The very first BIT was 
signed in 1959 between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan entering into force in 
1962. 9 Since then, the quantity of BITs has increased steadily reaching almost the number of 
"2,500 agreements at the end of 2005." 10 
2 Ibid, 190. 
3 The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) Draft Consolidated Text ( 1998) DAFFE/MAI(98)7 /REV I . 
4 See for the history of multilateral investment agreements Jarrod Wong "Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties : of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violation, and the Divide between Developing and 
Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes" (2006) 14 George Mason Law Review 135, 140. 
5 The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (17 December 1994) ( 1995) 33 I.L.M. 360. 
6 See Energy Charter www.encharter.org/ index.php?id=7 (accessed 30 September 2007). 
7 Thomas Walde "Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Treaty : From Dispute Settlement to Treaty 
Implementation" (I 996) Arbitration International 429 . 
8 see UN Conference on Trade and Development "Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995- 2006 : Trends in 
Investment Rulemaking" (2007) UNCT AD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, I www.unctad .org/en/docs/ iteiia20065 _ en.pdf 
(accessed 30 September 2007). 
9 See ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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Treaties providing for the protection of foreign investment, however, are not a novelty 
but arguably have been existent since the 18th century. 11 For example, in 1788 the United 
States and France agreed upon a Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty which already 
contained provisions related to the treatment of foreign investment. 12 
Though the structure of the treaty and the wording of particular clauses may vary 
among the multitude of BITs, their overall goal remains the same: They are conceived to 
safeguard and stimulate investments made by the nationals of one signatory in the other 
signatory's territory. 13 In order to overcome the objections of investors to the credibility of the 
economic and legal system of developing states, BITs generally include clauses related to fair 
and equitable treatment, full protection and security, minimum standards and most-favoured-
nation treatment. In addition, BITs usually provide for dispute settlement mechanisms in 
respect of disputes between the parties to a BIT or between a private investor and the host 
state. Thereby, the signatories typically refer to existing arbitration rules, e.g. the International 
Centre for the Settlement oflnvestment Disputes [ICSID] or the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], to settle any disagreements. 
14 ICSID is an 
institution closely-linked to the World Bank providing a framework for the conciliation and 
settlement of investment-related disputes .15 From an investor's perspective, the opportunity to 
bypass a domestic court system and directly submitting a dispute to a neutral international 
forum detached from the host State's influence is unequivocally one of the key advantages 
provided for by a BIT. 16 It particularly takes away the investor's fears of biased or even 
corrupt domestic courts. 
Until 1987 the disputes between investors and States resolved by ICSID tribunals were 
merely based on alleged violations of the individual investments between them. The first 
arbitration case between an investor and a State based on alleged violations of the underlying 
BIT was Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Republic of Sri Lanka. 17 Since then the total 
number of treaty-based cases increased to a total amount of255 by November 2006.
18 
11 see ibid, I . 
12 See ibid, fn I . 
13 A deeper analysis will be conducted within the course of this paper. 
14 see UNCT AD, above n 8, I 00 . 
15 See Worldbank www.worldbank.org/ icsid/cases/cases.htm (accessed 30 September 2007). 
16 See Wong, above n 4, 142. 
11 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v The Republic a/Sri Lanka (1990) ICSID Case No ARB/87/3. 
18 see UN Conference on Trade and Development " Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement" 
(2006) UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/ 11 , 2. 
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B Umbrella Clauses 
I Preliminary Remark 
This paper exclusively focuses on one typical BIT clause, the so-called umbrella 
clause, "also referred to as 'mirror effect', 'elevator', 'parallel effect ' , 'sanctity of contract' 
and 'pacta sunt servanda". 19 Analyses of BITs estimate that 40 per cent of the almost 2,500 
currently existing BITs contain such an umbrella clause.
20 
Although the exact wording of the clause may vary from BIT to BIT its overall goal 
remains the same: the signatories of a treaty mutually obligate to comply with commitments 
assumed with respect to investments in their territory made by nationals of the other signatory. 
The origins of the term 'umbrella clause' have been traced back to Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern 
who wrote in an article published in 1961 that an umbrella clause brought concession 
contracts under the 'umbrella of protection' of an investment treaty. 
21 This particular 
obligation may be framed in terms like "observe any obligation"
22
, "constantly guarantee the 
observance of the commitments"23 , or "create and maintain [ ... ] a legal framework apt to 
guarantee [ ... ] compliance[. ]"
24 Regardless of this simplified definition, the precise intentions 
behind the umbrella clause and its exact legal effects have been the subject-matter of a lively 
discourse among ICSID tribunals and legal commentators. 
2 Differential Approach towards Bases of Claims 
In order to grasp the practical relevance of the umbrella clause entirely, some 
preliminary remarks as to the differential approach towards the base of claims have to be 
made. 
19 Katia Yannaca- Small "Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Overview" (February 
2006) OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2006/1 , I 06, I 07. 
20 UNCTAD, above n 8, 73 . 
21 see generally Anthony C Sinclair "The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment 
Protection" (2004) 20 Arbitration International 411 ( citing Seidl-Hohenveldern at 412 , 413) . 
22 German Model BIT 1991 (2), Art 8(2). 
23 Accord entre la Confederation suisset la Republique islamique du Pakistan concernant la promotion et la 
protection reciproque des investissements ( 11 July 1995) AS 1998 260 I, Art 11 ; (my translation : Agreement 
between the Swiss Confederation and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on promotion and mutual protection of 
investments). 
24 Agreement Between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the Italian 
Rpublic on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (2 l July 1996), Art 2(4). 
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The relevant contractual framework in case of a foreign investment comprises two 
essential parts. On the one hand, there is the investment contract - or municipal contract -
between the private investor and the host State. On the other hand there is the BIT between 
the private investor's State of origin and the host State. Hence the host State's obligations 
towards the investor arise from two different sources: the investment contract and the treaty. 
In the event that an investor brings claims against a host State before an ICSID tribunal 
resting upon alleged violations of the latter's obligations, the tribunal adopts this differential 
approach as to the sources of the host State's obligations. "[A]rbitral tribunals distinguish 
between obligations [ ... ] arising out of the BIT [ ... ] and obligations arising out of the 
investment contract. "25 
Thereby, tribunals rely on the commonly accepted and undisputed principle in 
international law that the substantive Articles of a BIT "do not relate directly to breach of a 
municipal contract. Rather they set an independent standard. A state may breach a treaty 
without breaching a contract, and vice versa[.]"
26 Classifying the basis of the investor's claims 
as contract or treaty-based, tribunals "determine [these claims] by reference to its own proper 
or applicable law - in the case of the BIT, by international law; in the case of the [ ... ] 
[c]ontract, by the proper law of the contract [.]"
27 This differential approach as to the source 
of a claim and to its benchmark derives a differentiation of the state acting either as a 
merchant at eye level with the investor or as a sovereign endowed with governmental 
powers. 28 It does not mean, however, that breaches of the investment contract cannot 
simultaneously constitute breaches of the BIT. It rather signifies that in order for a contract 
violation to be constitutive of a BIT violation "a certain threshold has to be passed."
29 
Furthermore, tribunals infer from this differential approach conclusions as to their 
jurisdiction about claims brought before them by investors. These conclusions eventually 
account for the practical consequences of the differential approach. The crux of the matter is 
that ICSID tribunals merely exert jurisdiction over claims based on violations of the 
substantive standards of a BIT, e.g. fair and equitable treatment or most-favoured-nation 
25 Bjorn Kunoy "Singing in the Rain - Developments in the Interpretation of Umbrella Clauses" (2006) 7 Journal 
of World Investment and Trade 275,276. 
26 Companfa de Aguas de! Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic, Decision on application 
for annulment (2002) ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, 41 ILM 1135, para 96. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See Joy Mining Machinery limited v The Arabic Republic of Egypt (2004), Award on Jurisdiction ICSID Case 
No ARB/03/11, para 72; Wena Hotels Ltd. v Egypt (2000,) Decision on Application for Annulment ICSID Case 
No ARB/98/4, (2002) 41 ILM 933 , para 35. 
'9 - See Kunoy, above n 25, 299 et seq. 
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treatment. By contrast, as far as an investor's claims merely base upon violations of the 
investment contract, IC SID tribunals have proofed to be very reluctant to accept jurisdiction
30 
referring these claims back to the host State ' s domestic courts or other forums expressly 
agreed upon in the investment contract. ICSID tribunals make an exception as far as the 
claimant asserts that the breach of the contractual obligation passes the threshold to be a 
breach of the treaty. 31 In this case the tribunal has to deal thoroughly with alleged violations 
of the investment contract. 
Accordingly, the qualification of a claim as merely contractual or treaty-based directly 
decides on the forum by which a dispute is to be settled. Moreover, the classification of a 
claim as treaty-based prevents the host State from raising certain objections to the tribunal ' s 
jurisdiction. "Neither contractual forum selection clauses nor parallel proceedings in domestic 
courts or arbitration under such clauses can bar a treaty-based tribunal from discharging its 
responsibility to decide on claims for breaches of the treaty."
32 
3 Application of the Umbrella Clause 
(a) The SGS cases 
In light of investors' general reluctance to submit disputes to domestic courts of 
developing countries, it is not surprising that they made this issue a top priority and sought to 
overcome the differential treatment of contract and treaty-based claims. Thereby, investors 
tried to make use of the umbrella clause which until 2003 - although included in a large 
quantity of BITs since the 1950s - had been in a state of hibernation. The following illustrates 
the facts which finally led to its first practical tests . 
SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance (SGS) v Pakistan33 was the first case to deal 
thoroughly with the practical effect of the umbrella clause. Pakistan had concluded a ' Pre-
Shipment Inspection Agreement' (PSI) with SGS - a Swiss company - agreeing to pay a fixed 
charge in exchange for services. Article 11 of the PSI contained a dispute settlement provision 
30 See Societe Generate de Surveillance (SGS) v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2003) 42 ILM 1290, para 161 . 
31 
Vivendi , above n 26, para 111 et seq. 
32 Stanimir A Alexandrov " Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty - The Juri sdiction of Treaty-based 
Arbitration Tribunals to Decide of Contract Claims in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines" (2004) 5 The 
Journal of World Investment & Trade 555 , 564. 
33 SGS v Pakistan, above n 30. 
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which set forth that any dispute shall be settled by arbitration before the courts of Islamabad, 
Pakistan. Due to certain discrepancies, Pakistan terminated the contract and refused to pay the 
agreed charge. Thereupon, SGS sought resolution of the dispute by ICSID under the Swiss -
Pakistani BIT. 34 
SGS alleged that Pakistan inter alia " [had] failed to constantly guarantee the observance of 
the commitments it ha[ d] entered into with respect to SGS ' s investments, in violation of 
Article 11 of the BIT" 35 which states that " [ e ]ither Contracting Party shall constantly 
guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into with respect to the 
investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party." At the heart of this allegation 
was SGS' s approach that in addition to the substantive provisions of a BIT which are typically 
not breached until state conduct passes a certain threshold, the umbrella clause obliges the 
host state to ' constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments' 36 entered into with an 
investor with regard to a specific investment. The wording of this clause linguistically does 
not limit to treaty-obligations derived from the BIT but also encompasses mere contractual 
obligations arising out of the investment contract between the investor and the host state.
37 
Hence the umbrella clause also obliges to comply with any contractual obligation.38 Since the 
umbrella clause is a substantive provision of the treaty the compliance with contractual duties 
also becomes a treaty-based duty, on equal footing with other treaty-based duties like e.g. 
most-favoured-nation treatment39. According to SGS, it is " [t]he effect of an ' umbrella clause' 
[ ... ] is to elevate a breach of contract claim to a treaty claim under international law."
40 
Thus 
any violation of the contract between SGS and Pakistan simultaneously constitutes a breach of 
the treaty's umbrella clause making available the treaty ' s dispute settlement mechanism. By 
employing such interpretation SGS sought to overcome the differential treatment of 
contractual claims being enabled to override the contractual forum-choice-clause of the PSI 
bypassing the Courts of Islamabad and directly achieving a submission of their claim to the 
ICSID tribunal. 
34 See Swiss-Pakistani BIT, above n 23. 
35 SGS v Pakistan, above n 30, para 34. 
36 See Ibid, para 98. 
37 See Ibid, para 99. 
38 See Ibid , para 99. 
39 See Ibid , para 99 . 
40 See Ibid, para 98 ; Societe Generate de Surveillance (SGS) v Republic of the Philippines (2003) ICSID Case 
No ARB/02/6, para 65 . 
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The IC SID tribunal, however, explicitly rejected SGS 's approach stating that "Article 
11 of the BIT [did not have] the effect of entitling a Contracting Party's investor [ ... ] to 
'elevate' its claims grounded solely in a contract with another Contracting Party [ ... ] to 
claims grounded on the BIT[.]"41 The tribunal concluded that it had "no jurisdiction with 
respect to claims [ ... ] based on alleged breaches of the PSI Agreement which do not also 
constitute or amount to breaches of the substantive standards of the BIT."
42 
Just half a year later SGS tested this rejected approach again in SGS v Philippines.
43 
SGS alleged that the Philippines had failed to pay for services due under an investment 
agreement regarding the provision of import supervision services (CISS). SGS put forward 
that the Philippines was in breach of Article X(2) of the Swiss-Philippine BIT
44 which reads 
that "[ e Jach Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to 
specific investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting Party." Surprisingly, 
although the underlying circumstances of the case were quite similar to those in SGS v 
Pakistan this time the tribunal expressly approved of SGS 's rationale rigorously rejecting the 
approach of the tribunai.45 
(b) Aftermath of the SGS cases 
In the aftermath of the SGS decisions, ICSID tribunals dealt with the effect of the 
umbrella clause in more than a dozen cases. The overall outcome of the decisions, however, is 
far from being a clarification of its role. "This question has divided practitioners and legal 
commentators and remains unsettled in the international arbitral case law."
46 Thereby, "the 
umbrella clause is one, if not the most, hot topic in contemporary state-investor arbitration."
47 
Although a review of the recent publications on this issue supplies evidence for a wide 
variety of approaches, IC SID tribunals and legal commentators generally seem to be split into 
41 SGS v Pakistan, above n 30, para 165 . 
42 Ibid, para 162. 
43 SGS v Philippines, above n 40. 
44 Accord entre Ja Confederation suisse et la Republique des Philippines concernant la promotion et la protection 
reciproque des investissements (31 March 1997) AS 200 I 438 ; (my translations: Agreement between the Swiss 
Confederation and the Republic of the Philippines on promotion and mutual protection of investments). 
45 See SGS v Philippines, above n 40, para 121 et seq. 
46 Emmanuel Gaillard "Treaty-Based Jurisdiction : Broad Dispute Resolution Clauses" (2005) 234 New York 
Law Journal 68. 
47 Kunoy, above n 25 , 275. 
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two camps either following the narrow approach taken in SGS v Pakistan 
48 or the wide 
interpretation made in SGS v Philippines49. While the proportion between ICSID decisions 
favouring a narrow or a broad approach seems to be quite balanced, the situation among legal 
commentators is different. Among the latter, a considerable majority favours the wide 
approach. 
In addition, a few intermediate views seem to have emerged between these two 
diametrically opposed approaches. 50 A legal commentator - although finding that umbrella 
clauses should not lift all contractual disputes into a treaty-level - tries to accommodate the 
investor's interests by a double presumption in his favour. 
51 "[T]hat a contract with a 
government agency relating to 'investment' has a governmental character and [ ... ] that a 
dispute involving a government agency seeking to escape from the obligations of a contract is 
not 'merely commercial' but [ ... ] 'governmental'. "
52 
It is noteworthy, that this legal issue could already have ansen in 1998 in the case 
Fedax N V v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
53
. In this context, Venezuela refused to honour 
certain promissory notes it had issued to the claimant. This clearly contractual issue could 
48 See JCSID decisions in SGS v Pakistan, above n 30; Joy Mining, above n 28; CMS v Republic of Argentina 
(2005) JCSID Case No. ARB/01 /8; El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, Decision 
on Jurisdiction (2006) ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15; Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration 
Company v The Argentine Republic (2006) ICSID Case No. ARB/03/ 13 (El Paso, Pan American contain 
identical decisions on the umbrella clause, the decision will therefore be quoted together. The quotations refer to 
El Paso); see also Hakeem Seriki "Umbrella Clauses and Investment Treaty Arbitration: All Encompassing or 
Respite for Sovereign States and State Entities" (2007) Journal of Business 570; Judith Gill, Matthew Gearing 
and Gemma Birt "Contractual Claims and Bilateral Investment Treaties A Comparative Review of the SGS 
Cases" (2004) 21 Journal of International Arbitration 397. 
49 See ICSID decisions in SGS v Philippines, above n 40; Eureka B V v Poland (2005), Partial Award; 
Consorzio Groupement LES/ -DIPENTA v Republique algerienne democratique et populaire (2005) ICSID 
Case no ARB/03 /08; LG & E Energy Corp, LG & E Capital Corp, LG & E International Corp Inc v Argentine 
Republic (2006) ICSID Case No ARB/02/1; Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic (2005) ICSID 
Case No ARB/02/16; Siemens AG v Argentine Republic (2007), Award ICSID case No ARB/02/8; see also FA 
Mann "British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments" ( 1981) Brit Y B Int' I L 245; UN 
Conference on Trade and Development "Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid 1990s" UNCTAD/ITE/IlT/7 
( I st ed United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1998); Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (1 st ed, Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1995); Jarrod Wong, above n 4; John P Gaffney and 
James L Loftis "The 'Effective Ordinary Meaning' of B!Ts and the Jurisdiction of Treaty-Based Tribunals to 
Hear Contract Claims" (2007) 8 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 5, 15; Stanimir A Alexandrov 
"Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty- The Jurisdiction of Treaty-based Arbitration Tribunals to Decide 
of Contract Claims in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines" (2004) 5 The Journal of] World Investment & 
Trade 555; Christian Schreuer "Travelling the BIT Route: of Waiting Periods, Umbrella clauses and Forks in 
The Road" 5 (2004) J World Inv 231,249. 
so Thomas Walde1 above n I; Noble Ventures Inc v Romania, (2005), A ward ICSID Case No ARB/ 0 l /11 
(Although the outcome of this case is similar to SGS v Philippines it advocates some kind of intermediate 
position. The details will be discussed in the course of this paper). 
51 
see Thomas Walde, above n I, 232. 
52 
Ibid. 
53 Fedax N V v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (1998), Award ICSID Case No ARB/96/, ( I 998) 37 ILM 1391. 
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have been lifted onto the treaty level by Article 3 ( 4) of the Dutch - Venezuelan BIT which 
sets forth the host State ' s obligation to "observe any obligation it may have entered into with 
regard to the treatment of investments of nationals of the other Contracting Party." However, 
neither the claimant nor the tribunal thoroughly analysed the function of this clause. The 
tribunal merely applied its plain wording stating that "Venezuela is under the obligation to 
honour precisely the terms and conditions governing such agreement[.] "
54 Hence it simply 
assumed without any justification that the respondent - pursuant to the umbrella clause - was 
under a treaty-obligation to comply with contractual commitments. 
III UMBRELLA CLAUSES-PROS AND CONS 
A Preliminary Remark 
In the following the paper endeavours to elaborate on the arguments and 
counterarguments put forward by advocates of the narrow and the broad approach. Thereby, 
the paper distinguishes between decisions of ICSID tribunals and articles of legal 
commentators. This part confines itself to detecting the different kinds of reasoning. A 
thorough discussion of these arguments and an own interpretation will be conducted in part 
IV. 
B Vienna Convention 
1 ICSID tribunals - narrow approach 
Much as the existing notions differ in their approach towards the effect of the wnbrella 
clause, they at least unanimously agree on the validity of the Vienna Convention
55 as an 
overarching principle in the context of treaty interpretation. 
This is already expressed in the case SGS v Pakistan where the tribunal - although not 
expressly using the term ' Vienna Convention' - paraphrases the wording of its Article 31.
56 It 
points out that one has to "ascribe[ e] to [the words] their ordinary meaning in their context 
54 Ibid, para 29. 
55 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between 
International Organizations (Vienna Convention) (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331 . 
56 See SGS v Pakistan, above n 30, para 164. 
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and in the light of the object and purpose [ ... ] of that Treaty as a whole."57 Furthermore, the 
tribunal mentioning that "[a] treaty interpreter must[ ... ] seek to give effect to the object and 
purpose projected by [a] BIT"58 concludes that the highlighted principles are the "familiar 
norms of customary international law"59 in the context of treaty-interpretation. In view of this 
clear statement and the fact that this proposition precedes the analysis of the umbrella clause's 
wordings there can be no doubt that the tribunal accepts the Vienna Convention as the 
benchmark for treaty-interpretation. 
The interpretative approach taken by the tribunals in El Paso, Pan American v 
Argentina60, however, remains dubious. Without any allusion to the Vienna Convention the 
tribunal addresses canons of interpretation either in favour of the investor or the sovereignty 
of states. 61 Subsequently, the tribunal asserts to take up a balanced position "taking into 
account both State sovereignty [ ... ] and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its 
· · fl ,,62 contmumg ow. 
2 JCSJD tribunals - broad approach 
SGS v Philippines - although coming to a contrary conclusion - also accepts the 
Vienna Convention as authoritative when interpreting treaties. 63 Thereby, the tribunal's 
introduction to its own findings on the umbrella clause resembles the set-up of SGS v 
Philippines. The tribunal in SGS v Philippines initiates its analysis by firstly paraphrasing the 
text of Article 31 Vienna Convention alluding to the actual text, the object and purpose of the 
BIT, and the principle of effective interpretation.64 
The decision in Eureka v Poland is even straighter when stating that "the authoritative 
codification of the law of treaties is the Vienna Convention"65 and subsequently citing the 
wording of its Article 31. In a comparable manner the tribunal in Noble Ventures v Romania 
expressly states that "reference has to be made to Arts. 31 et seq of the Vienna Convention 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid, I 65 
59 Ibid. 
60 
El Paso, Pan American, above n 48. 
61 
See ibid, para 68 et seq. 
62 Ibid para 70. 
63 
See SGS v Philippines, above n 40, para 114. 
64 
See ibid. 
65 
Eureka, above n 49, para 247 
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[ .. . ] which reflect[ s] the customary international law concerning treaty interpretation. "66 It is 
noteworthy to say, that the decision Noble Ventures v Romania even goes beyond the 
references made by other tribunals to Article 31 of the Convention when explicitly referring 
to and citing the wording of Article 32 Vienna Convention.67 
3 Legal commentators - narrow and broad approach 
A survey of the articles published in the aftermath of the SGS decision also points to a 
broad consensus among legal commentators regardless of any affinity to the narrow68, the 
intermediate 69 or wide approach. 70 Legal commentators unanimously agree on Vienna 
Convention as the benchmark for treaty-interpretation. 
C Plain Wording 
I JCSJD tribunals - narrow approach 
Departing from the Vienna Convention as the benchmark in the context of treaty-
interpretation ICSID tribunals have typically addressed the 'plain wording' of the umbrella 
clause at issue. In SGS v Pakistan the tribunal discussed the broach approach put forward by 
SGS. Focussing on the plain wording of Article 11 of the Swiss-Pakistani BIT it came to the 
conclusion that the text of the umbrella clause "falls considerably short of saying what the 
Claimant asserts it means."71 The tribunal emphasised that the term ' commitments ' which a 
party is obliged to constantly observe is "not limited to contractual commitments" 72 The 
tribunal , thereby, deemed the term ' commitments ' to be much more extensive linguistically 
also covering "the municipal legislative or administrative or other unilateral measures of a 
Contracting Party."73 In addition, the tribunal also found the term ' commitments ' to extend 
not only to commitments of the State but also to "commitments [ . .. ] of any office, entity or 
subdivision[ ... ] or legal representative whose acts are[ .. . ] attributable to the State itself."
74 
66 Noble Ventures, above n 50 ,para 50. 
67 
See ibid , para 50 . 
68 
See Seriki, above n 48 , 573 , 576 . 
69 See Walde, above n l, 214. 
70 
See Wong, above n 4, 163 ; see Gaffney, Loftis, above n 49, 6. 
11 
SGS v Pakistan, above n 30, para 166. 
72 Ibid . 
73 Ibid . 
74 
Ibid . 
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Put simply, the tribunal recognising that the clause "appears susceptible of almost 
indefinite expansion" realised that SGS's broad interpretation of the umbrella clause was 
covered by its wording. This, however, in the tribunal's view did not suffice to transform 
breaches of contract into breaches of the treaty. In order to give the umbrella clause the effect 
asserted by SGS it arguably required a higher degree of linguistic accuracy. 
In Salini v Jordan the tribunal had to deal with an alleged umbrella clause whose 
wording differed considerably from the clauses in the SGS cases. The clause at stake - Article 
2(4) of the Italian - Jordan BIT - reads that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall create and 
maintain in its territory a legal framework apt to guarantee the investors the continuity of legal 
treatment, including the compliance, in good faith, of all undertakings assumed with regard to 
each specific investor." The tribunal expressly pointed to the individual wording of the clause 
stating that it "is couched in terms that are appreciably different from the provisions applied in 
the SGS arbitral decisions[.]"75 The tribunal elaborating on the linguistic differences to the 
SGS cases stated that in the present case "each Contracting Party did not commit itself to 
' observe' any 'obligation' it had previously assumed with regard to specific investments[ ... ]. 
It did not even guarantee the observance of commitments it had entered into [ .. . ] as did 
Pakistan." 76 
2 JCSJD tribunals - broad approach 
The statement of the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan referring to the broad wording of the 
umbrella clause is largely undisputed among the advocates of the broad approach. This notion 
even bases to a wide extent upon this textual argument. The differences to the decision on 
SGS v Pakistan rather rest the conclusion drawn from this broad wording. Whereas SGS v 
Pakistan required more textual accuracy the tribunal in SGS v Philippines found that the 
clause "means what is says[.]"77 It points out that the ordinary meaning of the terms ' any 
obligation', ' shall observe' and ' specific investments ' linguistically cover contractual 
investments. 78 The tribunal goes on that an interpretation of the clause as being limited to 
15 
Salini Construttori S p A and ltalstrade S p A v The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2004) ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/ 13, para 126. 
76 
Ibid. 
77 
SGS v Philippines, above n 40, para 119; see also Siemens v Argentina, above n 49, para 204. 
78 
See SGS v Philippines, above n 40, para 115. 
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violations of the treaty would "read into that provision words of limitation which are simply 
h ,,79 not t ere. 
In Eureka v Poland the tribunal dealt with the identically framed Article 3(5) of the 
Dutch-Polish BIT finding that the meaning of this clause was unambiguous. 80 According to 
the tribunal, "the phrase, 'shall observe' is imperative and categorical. 'Any' obligations [ ... ] 
means not only obligations of a certain type, but [ ... ] all [ ... ] obligations entered into with 
regard to investments[.]" 81 The tribunal in Siemens v Argentina expressed an identical 
approach as to the meaning of the term 'any' when interpreting the identically framed Article 
7(2) of the German-Argentine BIT. The tribunal remarked that "[t]he term "investment" [ ... ] 
linked as it is to 'any obligations', would cover any binding commitment entered into by 
Argentina in respect of such investment."82 
The tribunal in Noble Ventures v Romania - interpreting Article II(2)(c) of the US-
Romanian BIT83 - points out that the terms 'any obligation' and 'entered into with regard to 
investments' are "difficult not to regard [ ... ] as a clear reference to investment contracts. The 
employment of the notion 'entered into' indicates that specific commitments are referred to 
and not general commitments[.]"84 In view of this clear statement in favour of the broad 
approach, the tribunal's comments on the interpretation in SGS v Pakistan are remarkable. 
The tribunal alluding to the textual differences between the umbrella clauses in the US-
Romanian BIT and the Swiss-Pakistani BIT agreed with the approach taken by the tribunal in 
SGS v Pakistan stating that the wording of the umbrella clause of the Swiss-Pakistani BIT 
may give reason to an interpretation as "implicitly setting an international obligation of result 
for each Party to be fulfilled through appropriate means at the municipal level but without 
necessarily elevating municipal law obligations to international ones." 85 This decision - at 
least its attempt to reconcile the SGS cases - has so far remained unique. 
79 
Ibid, para 118; see also Siemens v Argentina, above n 49, para 206. 
80 
See Eureko, above n 49, para 246. 
81 
Ibid. 
82 Siemens v Argentina, above n 49, para 206. 
83 Treaty between the Government of the United States and of America and The Government of Romania 
concerning the reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (28 May 1992) Senate Treaty Doc l 02-
36; (Article 11(2)(c) of the treaty reads: Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with 
regard to investments.), 
84 
Noble Ventures, above n 50, para 51. 
85 
Ibid, para 58. 
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3 Legal commentators- narrow and broad approach 
Legal commentators regardless of their attitude towards the function of the umbrella 
clause unanimously agree that the plain wording of the clauses in the Swiss-Pakistani and 
Swiss-Philippine BIT covers - at least from a strictly textual point of view - the wide approach. 
A study of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)86 
when addressing Article 3(1) of the Denmark-Lithuania BIT87 finds that the "language of the 
provision is so broad that it could be interpreted to cover all kinds of obligations, explicit or 
implied, contractual or non-contractual, undertaken with respect to investment generally."88 
This notion implies the most extensive textual interpretation expanding the scope of the clause 
even beyond contractual commitments to all kinds of obligations. Thereby, it is in line with 
the identical textual interpretation of the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan. 
Although other scholars have interpreted the umbrella clauses less extensive, they 
unanimously regard the broad view as covered by the clauses ' wording. One scholar 
comments that "the natural interpretation of a broadly-worded umbrella clause referring 
simply to ' obligations' is that it includes contractual obligations[.]"89 Addressing the umbrella 
clause in SGS v Philippines the advocate of an intermediate approach annotates that "the view 
that it covers 'any' or 'simple' or ' commercial breaches' [is] [ . . . ]compatible with the textual 
formulation in most pacta sun/ servanda clauses[.]"90 This scholar employs a similar rationale 
with regard to the clause in SGS v Pakistan arguing that " [t]here is an explicit obligation -
' guarantee' - [ ... ] ; there is a reference to 'commitments entered into ' - and that should 
mainly be commitments of a contractual nature [Fn omitted] - and that commitments should 
relate to investments by foreign investors. 91 
86 See UNCTAD, above n 49, 56 . 
87 Agreement between the Government of Denmark and the Government of Lithuania concerning promotion and 
reciprocal Protection of Investment (30 March 1992) No 31059; (Article 3( I) reads : Each contracting party shall 
observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting 
Party.). 
88 
89 
UNCTAD, above n 49, 56. 
Wong, above n 4, 163. 
90 Walde, above n I, 209. 
91 Ibid, 214 . 
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D Restrictive Approach 
J JCSID tribunals - narrow approach 
The finding of this paper - which is that the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan regarded the 
broad interpretation as linguistically covered by the wording of the umbrella clause - raises 
the question as to why it finally adopted a narrow approach. The paper will give an answer to 
this question in the following: 
The tribunal in SGS v Pakistan made use of a canon of interpretation known as 
' restrictive interpretation' or in dubio mitius. This canon "applies in interpreting treaties, in 
deference to the sovereignty of states. If the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is 
to be preferred which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation [. ]"92 According to 
the rationale given in SGS v Pakistan, the claimant departed with his broad interpretation from 
an undisputed principle of international customary law, the differential treatment of contract 
and treaty-claims in terms of jurisdiction.93 Therefore, the tribunal - regardless the ordinary 
meaning of the clause - required more linguistic accuracy of the clause in order to overcome 
this principle. According to the tribunal, in such case "[t]he appropriate interpretive approach 
is the prudential one summed up in the literature as [ . .. ] in dubio mitius."94 It required that 
"clear and convincing evidence must be adduced [ . .. ] that [the transformation of contract into 
treaty-claims] was indeed the shared intent of the Contracting Parties [ ... ] in incorporating 
Article 11 in the BIT."95 Such evidence had - according to the tribunal - not been adduced.96 
Put simply, the tribunal put on the claimant a burden of proof for the shared intent of the 
parties when introducing the umbrella clause in the BIT. 
The ICSID tribunals in Pan American & El Paso v Argentina97 also relied on the 
rationale that exceptions are to be interpreted restrictively. 98 The tribunals - likewise pointing 
out that contractual obligations were not explicitly addressed in the umbrella clause 99 -
92 Lassa Oppenheim, Robert Yewdall , Jennings, Arthur Watts Oppenheim 's International Law Vo / I Peace Part 
2 (91" ed, Longman, London, 1992) 1278. 
93 See ll B 2 of this paper. 
94 
SGS v Pakistan, above n 30, para 171 . 
95 
SGS v Pakistan, above n 30, para 167. 
96 See Ibid. 
97 
El Paso, Pan American, above n 48. 
98 S 'b'd ee 1 1 , 77. 
99 See ibid, 74. 
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explicitly approved of the reasonmg in SGS v Pakistan. The preference of the canon of 
restrictive interpretation, however, is at odds with another statement of the tribunal. The 
tribunal characterises its interpretative approach as balanced interpretation between 
interpretative notions favouring protection of investors or State sovereignty. 100 This appears 
contradictory since the principle in dubfo mitius clearly favours the latter. 
2 JCSJD tribunals - broad approach 
The tribunal in Noble Ventures v Romania arguably remains the only supporter of the 
broad approach who applies a canon of restrictive interpretation. Discussing the umbrella 
clause in Art 2 (2) ( c) of the US - Romanian BIT the tribunal departs from the assumption 
that the clause "introduces an exception to the general separation of States obligations under 
municipal and [ ... ] international law [.)" 101 In line with the decisions in SGS v Pakistan and 
Pan American & El Paso v Argentina the tribunal infers that the identification of the clause's 
effect as lifting contract claims onto the treaty level can only arise from a restrictive 
interpretation[.)" 102 However, although interpreting the wording of the clause at issue 
restrictively the tribunal finally adopts a broad approach. 103 In contrast to the decision in Pan 
American & El Paso v Argentina where an identical framed clause was interpreted 
restrictively, the tribunal here was satisfied by the textual accuracy of the clause. Hence 
although employing a canon of restrictive interpretation the tribunal found that the "general 
and direct formulations [tend] to an assimilation of contractual obligations to treaty ones[.)" 104 
Aside from this unique decision ICSID tribunals favouring the wide approach have 
expressly taken issue with the application of this principle. The tribunal in Eureka v Poland 
apparently deeming this principle as outdated emphasised that it "could be seen as a reversion 
to a doctrine that has been displaced by contemporary customary international law[.) " 105 
The tribunal in SGS v Philippines turned on the assumption made in SGS v Pakistan 
that the claimant's interpretation departed from a principle of international law, the 
100 
See ibid, 67 et seq. 
IOI Noble Ventures, above n 50, para 55. 
102 
See ibid, para 55. 
103 
See ibid, para 60. 
104 
Ibid. 
105 
Eureka, above n 49, para 258. 
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differentiation between contract and treaty-claims. The tribunal pointed out that SGS v 
Pakistan relied in this assertion on the Vivendi case which confirmed this general distinction. 
Although by generally accepting this principle the tribunal alluded to a fundamental 
difference of the Vivendi case to SGS v Pakistan, the lack of an umbrella clause in the Franco-
Argentine BIT. 106 The tribunal in SGS v Philippines apparently deemed this basic distinction 
as overcome by the umbrella clause in the Swiss-Pakistani BIT stating that the tribunal in SGS 
v Pakistan "did not need to consider whether a clause in a treaty requiring a State to observe 
specific domestic commitments has effect in international law." 107 
3 Legal commentators- narrow approach 
A small number of legal commentators approve of the canon of restrictive 
interpretation applied in SGS v Pakistan and Pan American & El Paso v Argentina. Kunoy 
remarks that a restrictive interpretation is in line with the jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ)1°8 referring to the Court ' s finding in Elettronica Sicula S p a, United 
States v Italy that "an important principle of international law should not be held to have been 
tacitly dispensed with by international agreement, in the absence of words making clear an 
intention to do so." 109 Furthermore, Kunoy approving of the rationale in SGS v Pakistan that 
the departure from an international principle requires restrictive interpretation 110 asserts that 
"the interpretation has to be restrictive [Fn omitted] and in accordance with the customary 
rules of interpretation as reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention [.] " 111 He arguably 
tries to reconcile the principle in dubo mitius with the framework of the Vienna Convention. 
4 Legal commentators- broad approach 
Legal commentators favouring a broad approach criticise the recourse to a canon of 
restrictive interpretation. Its application is criticised inter alia as policy argument employed to 
circumvent the plain meaning of the umbrella clause. Alexandrov points out that "policy 
concern [about the scope of the clause] was permitted to trump the text of the BIT" 11 2 
106 
See SGS v Pilippines, above 11 40, para 122 
107 Ibid. 
108 See Kunoy, above n 25, 283 et seq. 
109 111ternatio11al Court of Justice (ICJ) Elettronica Sicula Spa, United States v Jtaly (l 989) TCJ Rep l 989, 42 . 110 
See Ku11oy, above 11 25, 286 
11 1 Ibid. 
112 
Alexa11drov, above 11 32, 570 
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The tribunal's substantial in SGS v Pakistan to overcome the plain wording of the 
clause have even been addressed in cases whose outcome did not depend on the interpretation 
of an umbrella clause at all. The IC SID tribunal in Tokios Tokel'es v Ukraine 113 remarked that 
in SGS v Pak;stan "the tribunal recognized that BIT claims and contract claims 'can both be 
described as 'disputes with respect to investment,' it nonetheless decided [ ... ] to exclude 
contract claims from the scope of "disputes" that could be submitted to IC SID arbitration." 114 
Walde criticises that the SGS v Pakistan tribunal put the burden of proof for the fact 
"that the text intends what it plainly means back to the claimant." 115 In his view, this infringes 
upon the common way to apply such a burden of proof. 116 The proper would be that "if the 
plain meaning is clear, the party disagreeing with the plain meaning has the burden to 
persuade the tribunal that the proper meaning is different from a superficially apparent 
meaning." 117 He also points to the practical difficulties this burden of proof poses for the 
claimant since "BIT negotiators [ ... ] tend to use existing models in a 'boilerplate' fashion" 118 
and do not thoroughly negotiate each clause of the BIT. "One cannot refuse to give effect to 
such language by requiring [ ... ] evidence that the parties have explicitly discussed the 
respective clause[.]" 119 
E Effet Utile Rule and Purpose of Umbrella Clauses 
I ICSID tribunals - narrow approach 
The tribunal in SGS v Pakistan raised concerns as to the practical effect of the BIT in 
case that a broad approach would be adopted remarking that "[ a ]ny alleged violation of [ ... ] 
contracts [ ... ] would be treated as a breach of the BIT." 120 In the tribunal's view this would 
render the further Articles of the BIT completely useless since "[t]here would be no real need 
113 
Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction (2004) ICSID Case No ARB/02/ 18. 114 
Ibid, fn 42 to para 52. 
11 5 Walde, above n 1, 217. 
116 
See Ibid, 217. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid, 218. 
120 SGS v Pakistan, above n 30, para 168 . 
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to demonstrate a violation of those substantive treaty standards if a simple breach of contract 
[ ... ] would suffice to constitute a treaty violation[.]" 121 
The tribunals in El Paso & Pan American BP v Argentina shared this concern. In their 
view, the equation of violations of contract and treaty obligations would make the inclusion of 
typical BIT provisions like fair and equitable treatment or full protection and security 
useless. 122 The tribunal concluded that in this case "it would be sufficient to include a so-
called 'umbrella clause' and a dispute settlement mechanism[.]" 123 
Interestingly, the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan had to deal with an identical objection of 
the claimant. Thereby, SGS was not concerned about the other substantive provisions of the 
BIT to be rendered useless but rather the umbrella clause itself. According to SGS the narrow 
approach "would render Article 11 inutile, a result abhorrent to the principle of effectiveness 
in treaty interpretation." 124 The tribunal, however, did not share this concern putting forward 
that the clause could still serve as "an implied affirmative commitment to enact implementing 
rules and regulations necessary or appropriate to give effect to a contractual or statutory 
undertaking in favour of investors of another Contracting Party that would otherwise be a 
dead letter." 125 
2 JCSJD tribunals - broad approach 
The fears that the narrow approach would leave the umbrella clause without any 
practical effect have largely been adopted by the advocates of the wide interpretation. In a 
broader context, the latter depart from a different conception of the purposes of the umbrella 
clause and its legal function. 
SGS v Philippines was the first tribunal to approach the meaning of the umbrella 
clause as given in SGS v Pakistan. It found that the latter "failed to give any clear meaning to 
the 'umbrella clause'." 126 An identical view expressed the tribunal in Noble Ventures v 
Romania arguing that the umbrella clause "would be very much an empty base unless 
121 Ibid. 
122 See El Paso, Pan American, above 11 48, para 76. 
123 Ibid. 
124 
SGS v Pakistan, above 11 30, para 172. 
125 Ibid. 
126 
SGS v Philippines, above 11 40, para 125. 
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understood as referring to contracts." 127 In the tribunal's view, international agreements are 
anyway subject to the rule of pacta sunt servanda. Hence for a clause confirming this 
principle would be no need. 128 Setting the broad and the narrow approach in contrast to each 
other the tribunal gave preference to the broad interpretation. The tribunal justified this 
decision by the principle of effectiveness according to which "a clause that is readily capable 
of being interpreted in [ ... ] [a] way [to remedy contractual breaches] and which would 
otherwise be deprived of practical applicability is naturally to be understood as protecting 
investors [.] " 129 
Moreover, the SGS v Philippines tribunal expressly rejected the interpretation of the 
umbrella clause in SGS v Pakistan as 'implied affirmative commitment' stating that "if [the 
clause] has any effect at all, [it] confers jurisdiction on an international tribunal, and needs to 
do so with adequate certainty." 130 This rationale is in line with Noble Ventures v Romania 
case in which the tribunal found that the umbrella clause "was intended to create [ ... ] 
obligations beyond those specified in other provisions of the BIT itself." 131 Likewise the 
tribunal in Eureka v Poland after relying on the principle of effectiveness 132 finds that the 
umbrella clause has two operative effects, to submit contracts to the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal and to transform breaches of contractual obligations not addressed by other BIT 
provisions into breaches of the umbrella clause. 133 
3 Legal commentators- narrow approach 
The assertion that the broad approach would render the whole BIT useless has met 
criticism on part of the supporters of the broad interpretation. Schreuer finds this assumption 
incorrect the since a "BIT's substantive provisions deal with non-discrimination, fair and 
equitable treatment[ ... ] and protection from expropriation." 134 Since these obligations are not 
normally implemented in investment contracts "extending the BIT's protection to investment 
contracts would not make the substance of a BIT superfluous." 135 Walde similarly argues that 
127 Noble Ventures , above n 50, para 51 . 
128 
See ibid. 
129 Ibid, 52. 
130 SGS v Philippines, above n 40, para 125. 
131 
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132 See Eureka, above n 49, para 248. 
133 
See ibid, para 250. 
134 
Schreuer, above n 49, 253. 
135 
Ibid. 
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"[a] pacta sunt servanda clause [ ... ] does not make other obligations redundant. An 
expropriation or discrimination can occur without a specific host-State contract being 
breached[.]" 
Walde elaborating on the SGS v Pakistan tribunal's view of the umbrella clause as 
'affirmative commitment' points out that this could be interpreted as a "far-reaching reform 
obligation on countries." 136 Supporters of the wide approach, however, unanimously agree 
that the umbrella clause's meaning is "to internationali[s]e contractual breaches and, hence 
confer additional protection on the investor." 137 Accordingly umbrella clauses were meant to 
add something to the protection already enjoyed, "to achieve more than what is already the 
norm under customary international law." 138 It "add[s] the compliance with investment 
contracts, or other under takings of the host state, to the BIT's substantive standards." 139 
The supporter of an intermediate approach, however, restricts the purpose of 
investment treaties as "to provide external discipline for governmental conduct but not a rule 
for commercial [ ... ] disputes"[.] 140 Accordingly, the broad interpretation infringes upon the 
purpose of BITs to "impose disciplines on governmental conduct, but not on any commercial 
involvement of State entities[.] " 141 
F Flood of Commercial Claims 
1 JCSID tr;bunals - narrow approach 
ICSID tribunals supporting a narrow approach extensively rely on alleged negative 
consequences of the wide interpretation. In SGS v Pakistan the tribunal found that the 
umbrella clause linguistically covers "an unlimited number of State contracts, as well as other 
municipal law instruments setting out State commitments including unilateral commitments 
[ ... ] [.]"
142 It concluded that "[a]ny alleged violation of those contracts and other instruments 
136 
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would be treated as a breach of the BIT."
143 In the tribunal's view, these consequences of the 
broad approach, were "far-reaching in scope, [ ... ] automatic and unqualified and sweeping in 
their operation, [ ... ] [ and] burdensome in their potential impact upon a Contracting 
Party[.]" 144 In the aftermath, this apprehension was explicitly shared by the tribunals in El 
Paso & Pan American v Argentina which also feared such effect to be "far-reaching [ ... ] 
[ and] quite destructive of the distinction between the national legal orders and the 
international legal order[.]" 145 
Finally, Rasjski in Eureka v Poland raises identical concerns in his dissention opinion 
of observing that by adopting a broad approach "this [t]ribunal has created a potentially 
dangerous precedent capable of producing negative effects on the further development of 
foreign capital participation in privatization of State owned companies." 146
 
2 ICSID tribunals - broad approach 
IS CID tribunals in favour of the wide approach do not share the outlined concerns. In 
order to counter these fears, the tribunal in SGS v Philippines emphasised that the umbrella 
clause to be applicable requires the host State to assume "a legal obligation [ ... ] vis-a-vis the 
specific investment - not as a matter of the application of some legal obligation of a general 
character." 147 The tribunal thereby opposed the extensive interpretation of the clause made in 
SGS v Pakistan as covering practically any - contractual, unilateral and administrative -
obligation. The LG&E v Argentina tribunal follows this rationale when pointing out the 
necessity of a "very specific [obligation] in relation to LG&E's investment in Argentina[.]"
148 
3 Legal commentators- narrow approach 
Legal commentators reiterate the arguments of ICSID tribunals related to potential 
negative effects asserting that "[t]he danger [ .. ] may come if the current dam is breached and 
if umbrella clauses do start to override exclusive jurisdiction clauses." 
149 Seriki explicitly 
143 
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states that "[t]he interpretation adopted by the SGS Philippines tribunal demonstrates the far-
reaching consequences [the] broad interpretation of' umbrella clauses' could have." 150 
4 Legal commentators- broad approach 
Advocates of the broad approach largely allude to the restrictive requirement that an 
investor has to assume obligations with regard to specific investments. Accordingly, the 
umbrella clause "will provide a remedy only if there has been a breach of the host State's 
legal obligations towards the investor." 151 However, legal commentators do not agree 
unanimously that this restriction is sufficient to counter the concerns raised by supporters of 
the narrow approach. Sporadic voices apparently note a potential danger when observing that 
"[p ]roblems could arise if investors were to start using the umbrella clause for trivial disputes. 
[ ... ] It is to be hoped that investors will invoke umbrella clauses with the appropriate 
restraint." 152 
Gaffney & Loftis stress that claims would merely be re-directed "from State courts or 
commercial arbitration tribunals to international investment arbitration tribunals[.]" 153 
Accordingly, the broad approach does not "create liability where none [ ... ] existed[.]" 154 They 
suggest that a "'flood' of claims would presumably be the result of a "flood" of State activity 
directed at investments[.]" 155 Gaffney & Loftis seem to regard arguments related to the 
negative consequences as spurious arguments whereby critics effectively rely on "intent 
arguments[ ... ] or public policy arguments[ ... ] and/or interpretive "canons"." 156 
The advocate of a middle approach breaks new ground when suggesting that the 
tribunal in SGS v Pakistan could have overcome its concerns by reading into the umbrella 
clause an additional prerequisite. 157 He recommends that for the transformation of a 
contractual breach into a breach of treaty "governmental powers and prerogative [ or their] 
abuse and the absence of a legitimating reason" 158 be required. 
150 
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G Position of Umbrella Clause in Treaty 
J JCSID tr;bunals - narrow approach 
The tribunal in SGS v Pak;stan in order to underpin its narrow approach also referred 
to the position of the umbrella clause within the Treaty. In the tribunal ' s view " [t]he 
separation of Article 11 from [ other substantive provisions] indicates [ .. . ] that [it] was not 
meant to project a substantive obligation like those set out in Articles 3 to 7[.]" 159 
2 JCSID tribunals - broad approach 
In Noble Ventures v Romania the tribunal supported its broad interpretation of the 
observing that it "forms part of the Article which provides for the major substantial 
obligations undertaken by the parties." 160 
The SGS v Philippines tribunal found that the position of the umbrella clause " is 
entitled to some weight." 161 However, the tribunal did "not regard the location of the 
provision as decisive[.]" 162 The tribunal particularly did not accept that the "same language in 
other Philippines BITs is legally operative, but that it is legally inoperative in the Swiss-
Philippines BIT merely because of its location." 163 This approach is shared by the tribunal in 
Eureka v Poland according to which the position of an umbrella clause was of little 
importance. 164 However, the tribunal observed that in the case at issue, the umbrella clause 
was placed among the substantive obligations. 165 
3 Legal commentators- narrow and broad approach 
Legal commentators in favour of the broad approach agree on the fact that an 
"argument based on the location [ ... ] is a legitimate support argument[.] " 166 However, it has 
to be borne in mind that this argument is not applicable outside the Swiss-Pakistani BIT since 
159 
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160 
Noble Ventures, above n 50, para 51 . 
16 1 
SGS v Philippines, above n 40, para 124. 
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"[ u Jmbrella clauses are frequently grouped together with the standards of treatment 
guaranteed by these treaties." 167 Another commentator points out that the reliance on the 
position "is read to much into the enumeration order of substantive obligations in BITs." 168 In 
view of the ordinary drafting process of treaties which largely bases on the utilisation of 
model clauses it cannot be assumed that the drafter really have thought thoroughly about the 
. . f h 1 169 pos1t10n o t e c ause. 
According to Walde, the position of the umbrella clause in the Swiss-Pakistani BIT 
after the dispute settlement mechanism and the fact that it has an own title could also give rise 
to a converse interpretation as "overarching principle." 170 
H Overriding of Forum Choice Clauses 
1 ICSID tribunals - narrow approach 
The tribunal in SGS v Pakistan within its rationale stressed another alleged negative 
consequence of the broad approach. In its view an investor would be enabled to "nullify any 
freely negotiated dispute settlement clause in a State contract[.]" 171 The tribunal arguably 
deemed this to be an alteration of the contractual balance in favour of the investor since "the 
State party to the contract would be effectively precluded from proceeding to the arbitral 
forum specified in the contract unless the investor was minded to agree." 172 
2 ICSID tribunals - broad approach 
The SGS v Philippines tribunal apparently shared this concern. Although in its view 
the umbrella clause elevated the contract claims onto the treaty-level, the tribunal decided to 
give preference to the forum-choice clause in the investment contract between investor and 
State, the PSI Agreement. 173 Consequently, the tribunal assumed jurisdiction over the 
contract claims but deemed them as not admissible and stayed the proceedings. 174 It justified 
167 
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168 
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170 
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its decision by pointing to "the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant. [ ... ] It is not to be 
presumed that [ ... ] a general provision has the effect of overriding specific provisions of 
particular contracts, freely negotiated between the parties." 175 Moreover, the tribunal regarded 
a BIT to be "a framework treaty, intended[ ... ] to support and supplement, not to override or 
replace, the actually negotiated investment arrangements[.] " 176 In the end, Furthermore, it 
argued that "a party should [ not] be allowed to rely on a contract as the basis of its claim 
when the contract itselfrefers that claim exclusively to another forum. " 177 
3 Legal commentators- narrow and broad approach 
The decision in SGS v Phihppines to declare SGS ' s contract claims inadmissible has 
met considerable criticism. One scholar observes that the tribunal picked up the overcome 
principle of exhaustion of local remedies stating that "in effect it re-introduced this !imitative 
principle, at least for the situation where the pacta sunt servanda clause [ ... ] meets an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause under domestic law. " 178 In addition, the notion of the tribunal is 
at odds with the meaning of the umbrella clause and the investor-state arbitration provisions 
"to provide the investor - irrespective of whether or not it was able to negotiate arbitration 
recourse with the government itself - with an international recourse out of the hands and 
control of a biased government." 179 
Another scholar puts forward that the decision in SGS v Philippines leaves the 
umbrella clause without any function except in cases "where the contract's forum selection 
clause designates the same forum as the BIT; and [ ... ] where the contract does not contain a 
forum selection clause."180 
Finally, a scholar accuses the SGS v Philippines tribunal of misinterpreting the precise 
effect of the umbrella clause. "[W]hile claims premised on the umbrella clause are defined by 
reference to the terms of contract, this act of incorporating the contract does not alter the fact 
that the claims ultimately are BIT claims whose ' nature ' is wholly that of treaty claims." 181 
There is an established principle in international customary law that contractual forum-choice 
175 lb'd 1 , para 14 I. 
176 
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clauses cannot prevent an international arbitral tribunal from deciding on treaty-based claims. 
Consequently, if the tribunal has deemed the elevated contract claims as real BIT claims it 
would have disregarded the contractual forum-choice clause since deciding on the contract 
claims. 182 
I Historical Sources and Shared Intent 
I ICSID tribunals - broad approach 
The tribunal in Eureka v Poland enumerates a number of historical sources 183 which 
shares its wide approach to the umbrella clause. A survey of these sources reveals that the 
history of the umbrella clause goes back to the middle of the 20th century. The tribunal inter 
alia refers to the inclusion of an umbrella clause in the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention of 
Investments Abroad 184 of 19 5 9. 
The tribunal particularly alludes to a comment by Prosper Weil on the umbrella clause 
in Article 2 of the Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development of 1967 185 where he observed that "an 'umbrella 
treaty' [ ... ] turns the obligation to perform the contract into an international obligation of the 
contracting State vis-a-vis the State of the other contracting party." 186 Furthermore, the 
tribunal relies on a statement of Mann who observed that the umbrella clauses was "a 
provision of particular importance in that it protects the investor against any interference with 
his contractual rights[.] 187 The tribunal also quotes Dolzer, Stevens who find that umbrella 
clauses "seek to ensure that each Party to the treaty will respect specific undertakings towards 
nationals of the other party. [ ... ] [I]t protects the investor's contractual rights against any 
182 
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interference which might be caused by either a simple breach of contract or by administrative 
or legislative acts[.]" 188 
The tribunal in Eureka v Poland does not infer the correctness of its wide approach 
directly from these sources. However, there can be no doubt that it at least implicitly tries to 
substantiate its own view by a reference to these historic comments on umbrella clauses. 
2 ICSID tr;bunals - broad approach 
Scholars arguing for a broad interpretation of the umbrella clause rely more explicitly 
on the mentioned sources. In this context, authors have argued that the "the sum of its history 
[ ... ] points unambiguously to [the] conclusion [that] [t]he umbrella clause applies to 
obligations arising under investor-State contracts so as to allow for their breach to be resolved 
as BIT violations" 189 and an "historical examination of the origins [ ... ] shows in the clearest 
manner that the intention of [the] State [ ... ] is to permit a breach of contract to be effectively 
characterised as the breach of an international treaty obligation." 190 Another author states that 
"[ a ]mple authorities support the view that the intent of States [ ... ] was [ ... ] to elevate the 
State's contractual breaches to the level of treaty violations." 191 
The vast reference to historical sources, however, also meets with criticism. One 
author argues that the umbrella clause was elaborated in middle of the 20th century within the 
context of concession agreements "which were then seen as [ ... ] subject to primarily 
administrative law[.]" 192 The implementation of the umbrella clause "was based on the 
assumption that States - not individual investors - would enforce [claims] before [ ... ] arbitral 
institutions [.]" 193 The then prevailing general unwillingness of governments to enforce claims 
of private investors implied some kind of 'screening function' by which merely commercial 
claims lacking allegations of abuse of governmental power were filtered out. 194 With the rise 
188 Dolzer & Stevens, above n 49, 81 et seq. 
189 Wong, above n 4, 149. 
190 Emmanuel Gaillard "Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims - The SGS Cases 
Considered" in international Investment Law and Arbitration: leading Cases from the JCSID, NAFTA, Bilateral 
Treaties and Customary International Law ( I st ed, Tod Weiler, London, 2005) 325. 
191 Alexandrow, above n 32, 567. 
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194 See ibid, 192. 
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of direct investor-state arbitration in the late 1980s 195 this filter ceased to exist. Until then an 
elevation of any contract claim onto the treaty level was just a theoretical possibility which, 
however, became reality because of direct investor-State arbitration and the broad wording of 
umbrella clauses.
196 
Notwithstanding, it was not the initial intent of drafters to elevate every 
commercial claim onto the treaty level. The author - addressing the often-quoted comments of 
Mann and Dolzer, Stevens - holds that these facts were not fully "thought trough [ .. . ] by the 
few commentators who thought the clause applied also to ' mere contract breaches ' [.]" 197 
IV DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS 
A Structure of Own Analysis I Vienna Convention 
1 Preliminary remark 
In light of the diverging approaches as to meaning and effect of the umbrella clause 
the question arises whether and how this conflict can be resolved. The answer thereto is 
simple. The meaning of the clause has to be ascertained by an interpretation of the clause 
itself and the treaty. "The purpose of treaty interpretation is to establish the common intention 
of the parties to the treaty." 198 This finding admittedly is not unique. Advocates of the narrow 
as well as the wide approach have interpreted the umbrella clause exhaustively. The different 
approaches after all arise from different results of these interpretations. The fact that these 
results are hardly reconcilable - or rather mutually exclusive - gives reason to the assumption 
that some of the interpretations are erroneous. This is surpsising given that all approaches 
agree on the same overarching principle in the interpretation of international treaties, the 
Vienna Convention, which sets forth a detailed interpretation set-up. One cannot help think 
that this set-up has not been applied properly. 
Although the Vienna Convention is not the only source of interpretative canons in the 
context of treaty-interpretation, this paper does not challenge its authortiative character. The 
principles embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are commonly being 
195 See ibid, 194. 
196 
See ibid, 195. 
197 
Ibid, 226 . 
198 European Communities - Customs Classification of Computer Equipment (5 June 1998) WT/DS62/AB/R, 
WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, para 93 (Appelate Body, WTO). 
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accepted as reflecting current customary international law, 199 even in cases in which states 
have not signed or ratified it. 200 This applies to both Articles 31 and 32.201 
The fact that practically every ICSID tribunal or legal commentator dealing with 
umbrella clauses consults the Vienna Convention supplies further evidence for the correctness 
of this statement. In view of this overall acceptance of the Vienna Convention and the diverse 
results of its application this paper starts with some general remarks as to its dogmatic 
structure. Having defined the particular elements of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention, the paper seeks to clarify the umbrella clauses by fastidiously applying these 
principles. Thereby, the paper endeavours to develop a rationale strictly in accordance with 
the dogmatic framework of the Convention. 
2 Article 31 - ordinary meaning and context 
The tribunal in Aguas de! Tunari SA v Republic of Bolivia exemplary summarises Article 31 
Vienna Convention which is the general rule of interpretation." 
Interpretation [ ... ] is a process of progressive encirclement where the interpreter starts under the general 
rule with (I) the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty, (2) in their context and (3) in light of the 
treaty's object and purpose [.] [ ... ] [Thereby,] the Vienna Convention does not privilege any one of 
these three aspects of the interpretation method.202 
The term 'context' is exhaustively defined in Article 31 (2) and (3) Vienna 
Convention. According to 31 (2) the text of the Treaty, including preamble and annexes, has 
to be interpreted in the light of any agreement or instrument related to the Treaty made either 
by all parties or at least one party accepted by the others in connexion with the conclusion of 
the Treaty. Pursuant to Article 31 (3) subsequent agreements regarding the interpretation or 
application of the treaty and subsequent practice in the application establishing an agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation may be taken into account together with the context. 
"As a practical matter [ ... ] there are likely to be few circumstances in which a tribunal will 
199 Oppenheim, above n 92, 1271. 
200 Aguas de! Tunari SA v Republic of Bolivia (2005) JCSlD Case No ARB/02/3, para 88; United States -
Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany (28 ovember 
2002) WT/DS2 l 3/ AB/R para 61, 62 (Appellate Body, WTO). 
201 Japan - Alcoholic Beverages If (I September 1996) WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/OS 10/AB/R, WT/DS 11 /AB/R, 
para 104 (Appelate Body, WTO). 
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need to ( or ought to) look for the relevant contextual information outside the treaty or 
instruments exchanged in connection with that treaty."203 
When ascertaining the ordinary wording of an umbrella clause one has to bear in mind 
that clauses can be framed differently. 204 Therefore, one has to focus on the individual 
wording of the clause at issue. "Hence, whether an 'umbrella clause' is construed as elevating 
'contractual claims' to the level of treaty obligations will ultimately depend on the exact 
wording of the clause in question."205 The tribunal in SGS v Philippines emphasised this 
proposition when suggesting that the "umbrella clause" in the Swiss-Pakistan BIT was 
formulated in different and rather vaguer terms than Article X(2) of the Swiss-Philippines 
BIT.206 
In the following the ordinary wording of the umbrella clauses discussed in the SGS 
cases will be ascertained. Since the umbrella clauses dealt with in the other ICSID decisions 
do not show any noticeable difference207 the obtained results directly apply to the umbrella 
clauses discussed therein. The wording of the umbrella clause in Article 2( 4) of the Italian -
Jordan BIT208 , however, differs considerably from the clauses of the SGS cases. Its ordinary 
meaning and the approach of the tribunal Salini v Jordan will be addressed separately. 
Both clauses209 begin with the mandatory term 'shall'. Hence from a textual point of 
view they appear to set forth binding provisions. This impression is underpinned by the fact 
that other substantive articles of the BITs which undoubtedly constitute binding provisions 
employ the same term. 210 Article 4 of the Swiss-Pakistani and Swiss-Philippine BIT e.g. 
introduces the other substantive provisions with the term 'shall'. It appears reasonable to 
award identically framed provisions within the same treaty a consistent signification. 
Accordingly, the term shall, of the umbrella clauses in the Swiss-Pakistani and Swiss-
Philippine BIT, point to the existence of a binding obligation. 
203 Gaffney, Loftis, above n 49, 8 (arguing similarly with regard to the context) . 
204 See Seriki, above n 48, 580; see also Joy Mining, above n 28, para 72. 
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The term 'any obligation' of Article X(2) of the Swiss-Philippine BIT implies no 
linguistic restriction to a certain type of obligation. It rather applies to ' any' obligations 
regardless of its contractual or treaty-related nature. An identical statement is to be made 
about the term "commitments" contained in Article 11 of the Swiss - Pakistani BIT. Although 
not employing the word ' any' the latter does not imply any restriction to a certain kind of 
obligation either. The term ' commitments ' linguistically covers both contractual and treaty-
obligations. If the drafters had indeed intended a limitation to certain obligations, this could 
have been expressed easily. 2 11 Such a limitation to "treaty-based" claims would have 
eliminated any doubts as to the scope of the provision. The ordinary meaning of both clauses, 
however, does not give rise to such an assumption. The ordinary meaning of the terms ' any 
obligation' and ' commitments' linguistically covers both obligations derived from the 
investment contract and from the treaty. 212 Moreover, these expressions are linked to the 
terms "observe" and "constantly guarantee the observance" which sets forth a continuous duty 
of compliance with contractual and treaty-based obligations. As the tribunal in SGS v 
Philippines puts it, limiting the scope of the clauses to obligations under treaty-provisions 
would be "read[ing] into that provision words of limitation which are simply not there."213 
A limitation of the scope of obligations covered by an umbrella clause finally arises 
from the terms ' entered into with respect to the investments of the investors ' or ' assumed with 
regard to specific investments ' . The expressions 'entered into ' and ' assumed' gives reasons to 
the assumption that for the State to be bound it must perform an activity. This activity has to 
be directed towards a certain, specified investment. An activity related to a specific 
investment normally is the conclusion of an investment contract with an investor - just these 
relate to specific investments. By contrast, BITs do not relate to particular investments but 
rather provide for an underlying framework. The limitation in shape of ' entered into ' or 
' assumed' has apparently been ignored by the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan which expressed its 
concern that the ordinary meaning of the clause not only covered contractual and treaty-based 
obligations but also unilateral and administrative duties. 
Consequently, the ordinary meanmg of both umbrella clauses supports the broad 
approach. Although they are framed in a different way the textual differences are marginal not 
justifying a differential treatment. This paper explicitly disapproves of the decision in Noble 
211 See ibid, para I I 8. 
212 see Wong, above n 4, 163 ; see UNCTAD, above n 49, 56; 
213 SGS v Philippines, above n 40, para I I 8. 
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Ventures v Romania insofar as the tribunal concludes that the ordinary meanmg of the 
umbrella clause in the Swiss-Pakistani BIT justifies the narrow approach of the tribunal in 
SGS v Pakistan.214 
The required focus on the individual wording of the umbrella clause at issue justified 
the tribunal's narrow approach in Salini v Jordan. 215 According to Article 2(4) of the Italian -
Jordan BIT the signatories obliged to "create and maintain a legal framework apt to guarantee 
the [ ... ] compliance [ ... ] of all undertakings assumed with regard to each specific investor." 
This duty is a rather general obligation and does not compel to comply with any obligation or 
commitment entered into with investors. 216 The obligation to maintain a framework apt to 
guarantee compliance linguistically relates to the establishment of institutions dealing with 
compliance like a specialised court system. The provision in Article 2(4) of the Italian -
Jordan BIT lacks the textual accuracy to lift any contractual obligation onto a treaty-level.217 
3 Article 31 - objective and purpose 
An interpretation in light of the treaty ' s object and purpose at first glance seems to be 
a gateway for speculations about the parties' intents when negotiating the treaty. This 
assumption, however, is erroneous since "[t]he object and purpose of the parties to [the] treaty 
are to be found, in the first instance, in the words in fact used by the parties in that 
paragraph."218 The "object and purpose must be ascertained [ ... ] from the text itself of [the] 
Article[ ... ] and the rest of the BIT."219 The wording of the treaty is not to be brought in line 
with far-fetched assumptions on the parties' intent. To the contrary, " [t]he parties are to be 
presumed to have that intention which appears from the ordinary meaning of the terms used 
by them. "220 
This strong reliance on the written text has to be seen against the background, that the 
Vienna Convention in its Article 31 shifts the emphasis of interpretation towards a strict 
214 8 See Noble Ventures, above n 50, para 5 . 
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216 
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textual approach 
221 
at the expense of other - rather teleological or subjective - canons not 
expressly laid down. The Vienna Convention represents a move away from the canons of 
interpretation previously common in treaty interpretation [.]" 222 " [T]he starting point of 
interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into 
the intentions of the parties. " 22 3 
Accordingly, any speculation about the object and purpose of a treaty which is based 
upon documents outside the exhaustive enumeration in Article 31 (2) and (3) "falls foul of 
customary international law as reflected in the Vienna Convention, in so far as treaty 
· · · d ,,224 mterpretatlon 1s concerne . 
The overall goal of a BIT is largely undisputed. It aims at the promotion of foreign 
investment. 225 This view is underpinned by a simple reading of the preamble introducing the 
BITs in the SGSs cases which alludes to "an endeavour to create and maintain favourable 
conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other. " 
In this context, the term 'create ' gives reason to the assumption that additional incentives 
beyond the status before signing the treaty were intended. Hence "BITs exist presumably 
because the State party wished to change some part of the status quo ante to promote new, 
desirable behaviour[.] " 226 
Bearing this in mind, it is coherent to interpret the ordinary wording of umbrella 
clauses in a manner that they offer an incentive for investors. 227 The incentive thereby is the 
opportunity for an investor to submit any kind of dispute to an unbiased international tribunal 
bypassing the domestic courts of the host state. By contrast, "merely affirming its pre-existing 
[international] obligations would provide little incentive to an investor." 228 Hence an 
interpretation of the clause ' s ordinary meaning in light of the object and purpose of the BIT 
leads to a comprehension of the umbrella clause as an incentive-driven provision. An 
221 See Oppenheim, above n 92, 1271 . 
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incentive in shape of enhanced judicial protection, however, is just offered when interpreting 
the clause broadly as equating contractual and treaty-based claims. 229 
This rationale, however, is criticised by some commentators arguing in favour of a 
narrower view of the object and purpose of BITs. Although the intention to support foreign 
investment is not disputed, the elevation of contract claims onto the treaty level is deemed as 
going to far. Accordingly, the comprehensive judicial protection for investors by international 
arbitral tribunals goes beyond the degree of protection envisaged by the drafters of these 
clauses. Supporters of this notion derive this conclusion from a different approach to a BIT's 
object and purpose as " impos[ing] disciplines on governmental conduct, but not on any 
commercial involvement of State entities[.]"230 The tribunal in El Paso & Pan American v 
Argentine applies a similar reasoning pointing out that internationally secured remedies are 
limited to State contracts while in a commercial contract there is no need for such 
mechanism. 23 1 
This limited approach to a BIT's sense, however, is not supported by a reading of the 
preamble and the other provisions of the treaty. The advocates of this approach draw their 
conclusions from far-fetched speculations about the shared intent of the parties . The paper has 
already shown that the object and purpose has to be ascertained primarily from the text of the 
treaty itself. Hence a reading of BITs as merely providing only protection governmental 
conduct exceeds the limits set forth by the textual approach of the Vienna Convention. 
Walde largely bases his intermediate view - in particular the differentiation from the 
broad approach - on this limited notion as to the protection envisaged by BITs. 232 This 
rationale has to be countered with the same argument: it is beyond the limits the Convention 
sets forth for the ascertainment of a treaty's object and purpose. In addition, the intermediate 
approach although advocated as "provid[ing] non-dogmatic flexibility for tribunals to 
appreciate[ . .. ] the degree to which[ .. . ] government conduct[ .. . ] indicates abuse - or not - of 
governmental powers" 233 rather provides for legal uncertainty. The lack of a doctrine of 
precedent in the ambit of ICSID and the constant change of the tribunals ' compositions has 
already led to totally opposed decisions on the meaning of identically framed umbrella clauses. 
229 See SGS v Philippines, above n 40, I 16 . 
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231 See El Paso, Pan American, above n 48 , para 77 
232 
See Walde, above n I, 196. 
233 ]bid, 236. 
- 36 -
One can therefore assume that ICSID tribunals will also come to different results when 
determining whether a state conduct involves abuse of governmental powers or not. Moreover, 
excluding commercial conduct from the clause ' s scope would provide incentives for 
governments to develop new methods to interfere with investment contracts. Governments 
could try to avoid the jurisdiction of an international arbitral tribunal by disguising their 
interference as merely commercial. A constant delay of payment based on alleged bad 
performance of the investor could have the same demoralising effect as direct expropriation or 
nationalisation. 
The argument of the SGS v Pakistan tribunal related to the position of the clause 
within the Swiss-Pakistani BIT is basically acceptable since it derives from the text of the 
treaty itself. 234 However, this argument is not strong enough to override the ordinary meaning 
of the clause. In addition, the conclusion that the position outside the substantive provisions 
weakens the clause ' s binding character is not imperative. Walde correctly points out an 
alternative interpretation of this fact as awarding particular importance.235 Accordingly, the 
compulsory character of the umbrella clause in SGS v Pakistan is not diminished by the fact 
that it is not placed together with other substantive obligations. By contrast, the reference in 
decisions arguing for the broad approach to its position among the substantive provisions236 
merely underpins the results already obtained from the interpretation of the plain wording. In 
these cases the position of the clause appears to be a legitimate supportive argument. 
../ Article 31 - effet utile 
In addition to the illustrated elements of Article 31 the effet utile rule, the principle that 
"the parties are assumed to intend the provisions of a treaty to have a certain effect and not to 
be meaningless: the maxim ut res magis valeal quam pereat"237 is considered to be embodied 
in the general rule of interpretation.238 "[T]he apparent goal of "in their context" is to ensure 
that the entire agreement of the parties, comprising the treaty and subsequent agreements 
b h . d f'+'. · ,,239 a out t e treaty, 1s ma e e 1ect1ve. 
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The broad approach awards the umbrella clause a umque function within the 
framework of a BIT. It transforms breaches of the contracts between investors and host States 
into breaches of the treaty. It has been shown that this would be in line with the ordinary 
meaning and the context and purpose of a BIT. Advocates of the narrow approach, however, 
criticise this as rendering the whole treaty useless. 
This assumption is erroneous. If a BIT - as stated in El Paso & Pan American BP v 
Argentina merely contained an umbrella clause and a dispute resolution clause - only the 
breaches of obligations entered into by the host State with an investor regarding a specific 
investment would be submitted to treaty arbitration. The other substantive provisions - like 
MFN, repatriation of funds etc - are normally not covered in investment contracts.240 Hence 
without these typical provisions in a BIT, breaches of these obligations would be without 
remedy. 
241 
The reference of legal commentators to the fact that breaches of treaty obligations 
can occur without simultaneous being a breach of a contract is correct. 242 An expropriation 
can be in accordance with the domestic law of a host state whereas under a BIT provision the 
corresponding domestic Jaw as a whole might be deemed discriminatory. Consequently, the 
broad approach does not render the other substantive treaty provisions useless. 
The question as to the practical effect awarded to the umbrella clause by the narrow 
approach is more difficult to answer. What can an umbrella clause effectuate if not elevating 
contract breaches onto the treaty level? Advocates of the narrow approach largely have 
factored out this issue in their comments. Merely the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan attempted to 
award the clause a practical effect as "implied affirmative commitment to enact implementing 
rules and regulations necessary or appropriate to give effect to a contractual or statutory 
undertaking in favour of investors of another Contracting Party that would otherwise be a 
dead letter. "243 
The term 'affirmative commitment' already raises serious doubts as to the practical 
effect of this definition. An ' affirmative commitment' does not create new obligations but 
confirms already existing commitments. A simple reading of this definition suggests that it 
does not give the umbrella clause any additional valour beyond the already existing 
240 See Schreuer, above n 49, 253 
24 1 
See Ibid. 
242 See Ibid. 
243 SGS v Pakistan, above n 30, para 172 
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commitments. Walde correctly states that it is not clear what this definition means.244 He also 
points out the potential far-reaching consequences this definition might have: Would an 
investor "be able to sue a government because its national law [ ... ] does not protect 
contractual commitments sufficiently?"245 
Such a reading, however, would indeed be a far-reaching intrusion into the sovereignty 
of the host state.246 It would also be a contradiction the general tendency in SGS v Pakistan to 
preserve the sovereignty of host states by applying the principle in dubio mitius. 
Consequently, only the broad approach awards a clear and practical effect to the 
umbrella clause. This effect does not render the other substantive provisions of the BIT 
useless. By contrast, the function as suggested by SGS v Pakistan lacks of a clear meaning 
and infringes upon the effet utile rule. 
5 Article 32 - supplementary means 
"The application of the basic rule of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention will usually establish a clear and reasonable meaning." 247 However, 
according to Article 32 Vienna Convention supplementary means of interpretation, including 
preparatory work and the circumstances of its conclusion may be consulted in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31. This, however, does not 
change the fact that Article 31 Vienna Convention is the central provision, the general rule. 
In order to determine the meaning of a clause, supplementary means of interpretation 
may only be stressed in case that the general rule leaves the meaning of the text ambiguous or 
obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or umeasonable. Just in this case, 
canons of interpretation that have not found their way into the general rule of Article 31 
Vienna Convention can supportively be consulted as "supplementary means." 
This paper, however, has shown that the ordinary meaning of the wnbrella clauses in 
the SGS cases remains neither obscure nor ambiguous. A simple reading of the clauses in 
244 
see Walde, above n I, 221 
245 Ibid. 
246 
See Ibid. 
247 
Oppenheim, above n 92, 1275 . 
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their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty rather justifies their 
comprehension as elevating all contract claims onto the treaty level. Accordingly, recourse to 
supplementary means of interpretation, the preparatory work of the treaties and the 
circumstances of its conclusion is not necessary in order to determine their meaning. 
6 Arguments beyond the scope of the Vienna Convention 
(a) Preliminary remark 
This paper has shown that in order to determine the meaning of the umbrella clauses a 
recourse to the means of Article 32 Vienna Convention is not necessary. This proposition, 
however, has been disregarded by a considerable quantity of IC SID tribunals and scholar. The 
paper therefore discusses in the following particular arguments totally incompatible with the 
structure of Articles 31 and 32 Vienna Convention. 
(b) Historical sources I shared intent 
The paper has shown under III H that advocates of the broad approach extensively rely 
on works of legal commentators published between 1950 and 1980. Regardless of the final 
correctness of the final outcome the reliance on these sources is clearly beyond the scope of 
the Vienna Convention. 
Treaty-interpretation in accordance with the Convention follows a strict set-up. 
Thereby, any documents - aside from the treaty at issue - which can supportively be consulted 
are exclusively enumerated in Articles 31 (2) and (3). A closer look at the acceptable 
documents shows that these have to be "related to the Treaty." "The elements of interpretation 
[ ... ] all relate to the agreement between the parties at the time when or after it received 
authentic expression in the text. Ex hypothesi this is not the case with preparatory work[.]"248 
"The context is limited to ancillary agreements or instruments accepted and agreed to by all 
parties. "249 
Advocates of the wide approach rely on the publications of legal commentators made 
long before the signing of the Treaty at issue. Therefore, these sources are clearly beyond the 
248 ILC, above n 218, 220 . 
249 Gaffney, Loftis, above n 49, 20 . 
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scope of documents which - according to Article 31 Vienna Convention - have to be 
considered as the context. If at all these publications could be consulted as preparatory work 
within the scope of Article 32. However, they do not constitute "preparatory work" of the 
concrete BIT whose umbrella clause is to be interpreted. They rather are statements about the 
general intent of States when negotiation umbrella clauses or comments related to clauses in 
other BITS. What's more, these comments have not been made by the official representatives 
of the signatories but by legal commentators outside the state machinery. 
The same argument applies to the speculations of the supporters of the narrow 
approach about the "shard intent" of the parties not embodied in the materials allowed by the 
Vienna Convention. "The evidence of 'shared intent' on which most critics rely - the 
historical reticence of States to be the subject of direct claims in arbitration - has no place in 
this prescribed analytical framework." 250 These assumptions largely not even base upon 
documents but upon unfounded speculations about the intentions of states in general. Seriki 
points out that "it is doubtful [ ... ] [that] [states] intended that umbrella clauses could be used 
as a basis for bringing contractual claims against the state by the foreign investor. " 25 1 It 
remains ambiguous where this conclusion comes from. In addition, it gives reason to the 
suspicion that the ordinary wording of the umbrella clauses is wilfully disregarded and 
adapted to political views."252 Apparently, [m]uch of this argument [ ... ] is the product of 
purported canons of interpretation or drawn from ideological, rather than legal, sources."253 
( c) Consequences 
The same rationale can be applied as far as supporters of the narrow approach point to 
possible negative consequences of the broad interpretation. The framework of the Vienna 
Convention does not provide for the consideration of consequences within the interpretation 
of a treaty. This is coherent in view of its textual approach to presume the parties to have the 
intention which appears from the plain wording of the use terms. Relying on the alleged 
negative consequences advocates of the narrow approach turn this principle on the head by 
adapting the ordinary wording to their personal views of adequate drafting. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Seriki, above n 48, 567. 
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Furthermore, it is not acceptable to override the authentic text merely because of 
careless drafting not considering potential effects certain clauses might have. In the end, it is 
questionable if the floodgate-concerns are persuasive at all. Gaffney & Loftis correctly point 
out that the umbrella clause does not create new liability but merely redirects it from domestic 
courts to international arbitral tribunals. Their further statement as to the "insignificant 
number of treaty claims under observance of obligations clauses" in view of "the astonishing 
level of direct investment and a web of over 2,000 BITs"254 is convincing in view of the 
limited amount ofICSID decisions which substantially have dealt with umbrella clauses.255 
( c) Restrictive approach / in dubio mitius 
Some considerations have to be made with respect to the interpretative canon in dubio 
mitius relied on by the tribunals in SGS v Pakistan, Noble Ventures v Romania and Pan 
American & El Paso v Argentina. 256 These tribunals - together with a number of legal 
commentators257 - make use of a principle which "applies in interpreting treaties, in deference 
to the sovereignty of states. If the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be 
preferred which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation [.]"258 In these decisions, 
the tribunals expressly accepted the mandatory character of the Vienna Convention. However, 
since they found that the umbrella clause introduced an exception to international customary 
law they shifted to a restrictive canon of interpretation. The effort to combine these principles 
is exemplified by the statement of a legal commentator who argues that interpretation has to 
be both restrictive and in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. 259 
It has already been pointed out that the differential treatment of contract and treaty 
claims is a settled principle in international customary law. This is not questioned by this 
paper. However, " this conceptual distinction is not a peremptory norm[.]"260 Accordingly, the 
254 Gaffney, Loftis, above n 49, 21 . 
255 Ibid. 
256 see the decisions under III D. 
257 see the legal comments under III D. 
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umbrella clause is perfectly reconcilable with this principle; the umbrella clause even requires 
its existence. It is the very sense of the umbrella clause to overcome this distinction.261 
Advocates of the narrow approach, however, have drawn the conclusion that a break 
with this principle requires a restrictive interpretation. This is based on the erroneous 
assumption that the Vienna Convention and the canon of restrictive interpretation are 
combinable. In dubio mitius is not part of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention which sets 
forth the general rule when interpreting treaties. This principle is rather recognized in 
international law as a "supplementary means of interpretation"262 within the scope of Article 
32. This Article may be stressed when the interpretation according to Article 31 remains 
obscure or ambiguous. It is not on an equal footing with the primary rules in Article 31 . 
Consequently, considering Article 31 Vienna Convention and the canon of restrictive 
interpretation as simultaneously applicable infringes upon the hierarchical structure of the 
Convention as regards to interpretative canons according to which in dubio mitius merely 
plays a minor role as supplementary means. Applying the structure of the Vienna Convention 
correctly, in dubio mitius could only be stressed in order to confirm the result of an 
application of Article 31 or in case that an application leaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure. 263 This paper, however, has already shown that the interpretation of the ordinary 
meaning leaves no doubts or ambiguities. 
IX CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that the "effective ordinary meaning" of [the umbrella clauses in 
the SGS cases] permits a tribunal to accept jurisdiction over a claim based on a breach of 
contract when that breach might not otherwise give rise to direct responsibility in international 
law[.]"264 It has also shown that the narrow and intermediate approach is not reconcilable with 
the ordinary meaning of the clauses when interpreted in their context and in light in their 
object and purpose. Only the broad approach meets these demands. In addition, since the 
wordings of the umbrella clauses discussed by other ICSID tribunals are identical to X(2) of 
the Swiss-Philippine BIT the results of this paper are widely applicable . 
261 Ibid , 299 et seq. 
262 Ibid, 1275 ; EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (13 February 1998) 
WT/DS26/AB/R WT/DS48/AB/R para 135, Fn 154 (Appellate Body, WTO) 
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As Shany puts it in a slightly differed context, "the conflicting jurisprudence of IC SID 
tribunals over these issues cannot be attributed to the relatively minor textual differences 
between the BITs applicable to those cases but, rather, to an ideological chasm." 265 The 
different approaches to the umbrella clause need to be regarded as a struggle between 
ideologies "highlightening state sovereignty" 266 and those underpinning "a liberal and 
cosmopolitan view in favour of international commerce." 267 "Lawyers and legal scholars 
closer in the background, cultural and professional affinity and loyalty to the State are likely 
to emphasise sovereignty over contract, while those closer to economics [ ... ] will appreciate 
more the link between prosperity and sanctity of contract." 268 "[T]he disagreement over 
umbrella clauses in this scenario is in effect an extension of the enduring tension between 
developing and developed countries on foreign investment. "269 
Occasionally, advocates of the narrow approach appear to have irrational fears of 
international arbitration. In this context, one has to remember "that the enforcement of 
umbrella clauses [before international arbitral tribunals] does not lead to a final award on the 
merits in favor of the investor; it results rather in an arbitral procedure for resolving the 
dispute that does not inherently favor either party. " 270 Although in the heat of the battle, 
advocates of these approaches might be enticed to cling to any argument apparently capable 
of underlining the own view, a proper solution can only be found by a meticulous application 
of the principles of the Vienna Convention. Possible negative consequences for host states as 
put forward within the discussion are self-inflicted. Maybe in the long run these consequences 
might contribute to more accuracy and linguistic discipline within the treaty-making process. 
Linguistic discipline not an end in itself but a contribution to the accuracy required by the 
textual approach embodied in the Vienna Convention. The future consequences of this 
conflict still remain to be seen. It might be that host States unsatisfied by the wide approach 
taken by a number of ICSID tribunals try to renegotiate BITs
271 or at least "alter their BIT 
drafting [ ... ] practice" in the future. 272 Maybe "[a] domestic court will, in the long run, 
265 Yuval Shany "Note and Comment: Contract Claims vs . Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts Between lCSID 
Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claims" (2005) 99 Am J lnt'l L 835, 844. 
266 Walde, above n I, 184. 
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acquire more independence if supported by international tribunals, in particular if those take 
on the politically most sensitive responsibilities."273 
273 Walde, above n I, 187. 
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